

# Assessment of dose rates due to a criticality accident - Influence of source and protections

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
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**Context :** In the event of a criticality accident, exposure to ionizing radiations of workers located close to the accident site can be consequent. Moreover, as in the case of the Tokai-Mura criticality accident (Japan, 1999), significant dose rates can be reported at large distances from the place of the accident (several mSv.h<sup>-1</sup> at several hundreds meters). The purpose of this poster is to present and analyse some dose rates due to neutron and secondary gamma radiations depending on different parameters (nature of source, nature of biological protections...).

**Tools :** As a technical support to the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) has developed an expert support tool, allowing to quickly assess the dosimetric consequences in case of a criticality accident (CODAC as COnséquence Dosimétrique d'un Accident de Criticité) :

- neutron,  $\gamma$  and total dose rate calculations
- variable configurations (source, shielding)
- up to 1 km from the location of the accident
- Variable number of fissions per second, and 2.874 neutrons per fission

## Geometry : 1-D spherical



## A few values of dose rates at 100 meters...


These dose rates are calculated for  $5 \cdot 10^{16}$  neutrons/s, a typical value for a criticality accident.

After 1 m ordinary concrete :	11.3	mSv.h <sup>-1</sup>
After 2 m ordinary concrete :	20.9	$\mu$ Sv.h <sup>-1</sup>
After 1.4 m lead glass :	174	mSv.h <sup>-1</sup>
After 62 cm lead glass + 1 m concrete :	852	$\mu$ Sv.h <sup>-1</sup>

Large dose rates, even outside of plants

## Influence of source


Calculations at 10 m from thicker protection, relative to metallic <sup>239</sup>Pu source (d=19.82):



- 11 g/cm<sup>3</sup> powder = metallic source
- Strong impact of source moderation and auto-absorption over dose rate
- Supplemental moderation from concrete shielding (hydrogen abundant)
- 25 cm steel attenuates mainly  $\gamma$  -> low impact on total dose rate

## Influence of protections


Attenuation factors for various shielding materials, estimated at 10 m from the center of source (200g/l <sup>239</sup>Pu(NO<sub>3</sub>)<sub>3</sub>, 16 l), against naked source dose rate:



- Concretes by growing efficiency: magnetite, baryte, ordinary, then colemanite - reversal after around 140 cm width.
- At equal width, ordinary concrete more efficient than steel, lead and lead glass (strong neutron source)

## Secondary gamma radiations component


Calculations with metallic <sup>239</sup>Pu source (d=19.82) and at 10 meters from protection:



- With growing ordinary concrete width : growing attenuation of neutron flux, dose rate mainly due to  $\gamma$  after thick concrete shield (outside of plants)
- Magnetite and baryte concretes better  $\gamma$  shields than ordinary and colemanite concretes BUT neutron dose rates higher

## Hot cells

Calculations for few realistic two-layers shieldings, estimated at 10 m from the center of source (200g/l <sup>239</sup>Pu(NO<sub>3</sub>)<sub>3</sub>, 16 l):



- Presence of viewing windows in hot cells could cause significant increase of dose rates in some directions
- Added lead layer in hot cells allows dose rates lowering outside of plants